GTIG says UNC6240 (ShinyHunters) is again exploiting PeopleSoft CVE-2026-35273, using /%50SEMHUB/ to slip past WAF rules. Patch, then hunt.
Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG, Mandiant) reported on 26 September 2026 that UNC6240, which it tracks as ShinyHunters, is again exploiting CVE-2026-35273 in Oracle PeopleSoft PeopleTools. GTIG describes web shells deployed on dozens of systems globally. The campaign runs months after Oracle's out-of-band fix and gets past perimeter rules with a one-character trick: percent-encoding the letter P in the request path. GTIG says the actor targeted organisations that put WAF rules in place but did not patch.
Update, 27 Oct 2026: Trend's Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) has published a technical write-up of CVE-2026-35273 by Bobby Gould, crediting research by Minh Giang and Lucas Miller of TrendAI Research. ZDI says it reported three distinct bugs to Oracle on 10 June 2026, which Oracle fixed under this single CVE, and that it is coordinating with Oracle on separate CVEs for each. Oracle's Security Alert lists PeopleTools 8.61 and 8.62 as the supported versions affected and does not name fixed version numbers; the patches are listed in its PeopleSoft Patch Availability Document. See How the chain works below.
Update, 8 Nov 2026: Two details from the primary sources change what to do. GTIG says to restrict not only EMHub but also the Integration Broker listening connector from the public internet, and says this does not break standard PIA user sessions. That is the
/PSIGW/entry point in the ZDI chain below. ZDI also says its three bugs still have no separate CVE ids; it is coordinating with Oracle on them, so treat further IDs as pending rather than assuming they are covered by the June patch notes. Its XML route is also, in its words, less likely to be noticed by standard detection methods.
What is affected
CVE-2026-35273 is a flaw in the Updates Environment Management component of PeopleSoft Enterprise PeopleTools. Per the CVE record, an unauthenticated attacker with HTTP access can take over the product. The record lists PeopleTools 8.61 and 8.62 as affected and carries a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.8 (Critical), vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, supplied by Oracle as the CVE Numbering Authority. CISA's ADP data in the same record classifies it as CWE-306, missing authentication for a critical function. GTIG identifies the vulnerable code as the Environment Management Hub (PSEMHUB) servlet.
The timeline, as reported by GTIG and the CVE record:
- 27 May to 9 June 2026: zero-day exploitation, predominantly against higher education (GTIG).
- 10 June 2026: Oracle issues an out-of-band Security Alert (GTIG).
- 12 June 2026: CISA adds the flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. CISA's SSVC data in the CVE record rates exploitation as active, the flaw as automatable, and technical impact as total.
- 15 June 2026: CISA's due date for federal agencies. The KEV entry flags known ransomware campaign use as "Known".
- 26 September 2026: GTIG publishes its report on the renewed campaign, covering intrusions in September.
The renewed wave is broader than the original. GTIG lists higher education, technology, IT services, healthcare, agriculture, transportation and government among the targets.
The bypass
Defenders who blocked /PSEMHUB/ at a WAF or reverse proxy were not protected. The actor requests /%50SEMHUB/ instead, where %50 is the URL encoding of P. GTIG explains why it works: many WAF and reverse-proxy rules match the literal path before URL decoding, while the PeopleSoft application server decodes the request and routes it to the vulnerable servlet. GTIG tells defenders to assume the actor may use any percent-encoded, mixed-case or otherwise non-normalised variant of /PSEMHUB/, and to enforce blocking on the normalised path.
Attack chain
GTIG describes a consistent sequence. First comes verification: five to 15 POST requests to /%50SEMHUB/hub carrying a serialized Java object. Unpatched servers respond with the host operating system without writing files or disrupting the service, so the check is quiet.
Exploitation then follows one of two routes:
- Web shell. Further
POSTrequests to the same endpoint drop JSP files, includingx.jsp,u.jspand sequentially numbered files, into thePSEMHUB.wardirectory. GTIG notes the repetition likely ensures every node behind a load balancer gets a copy.x.jspis a cross-platform command shell that accepts hex-encoded commands viaPOST(c) with an optional timeout (t).u.jspdecodes Base64 file chunks and writes or appends them to a target path in 150 KB increments. - Fileless. Command output returns directly in the HTTP response with no file written to disk. The only host trace is shell processes (
cmd.exeor/bin/sh) spawned by the WebLogic Java process, so detections built on JSP file creation will miss it.
Follow-on tooling includes Ple64.exe, a trojanized installer that masquerades as a signed installer for the Light Alloy media player. It carries an EV code-signing certificate issued through Sectigo to "Tobias Weihmann Software Development OU", and GTIG says it has asked Sectigo to revoke it. GTIG says it runs a three-stage chain that loads the SIDEEYE C++ backdoor in memory. SIDEEYE supports browser and desktop credential theft, process and file management, and an interactive reverse shell and reverse proxy, and it talks to its command server over raw TCP. The actor also deploys the open-source Neo-reGeorg toolkit (tunnel.jsp or tunnel.jspx), which carries SOCKS5 proxy traffic over ordinary HTTP and HTTPS to the web tier, and on Linux uses the legitimate remote management tool MeshAgent for persistence. A quarter of the actor's commands ran as root or NT Authority\SYSTEM.
How the chain works
ZDI's write-up explains how an outsider reaches PSEMHUB at all. The Environment Management Hub is an internal management interface, and its validateClient check only admits trusted clients listed in /envmetadata/config/allowedhosts.properties. The default file trusts localhost.
How the three ZDI-reported bugs chain under CVE-2026-35273, per the Zero Day Initiative write-up.
- SSRF through the Integration Gateway (ZDI-CAN-31816). The attacker sends an unauthenticated
POSTto/PSIGW/HttpListeningConnector, names theHttpTargetConnectorhandler, and points it at127.0.0.1. The attacker controls both the destination URL and the full request body, and because the forwarded request now comes from localhost, it passesvalidateClient. - Arbitrary file write in PSEMHUB (ZDI-CAN-31818). The
ExecuteProcessActivityCommandhandler is meant to let remote clients write log entries, but it takes both the file contents (m_line) and the absolute output path (m_targetFile) from the caller without checking that the path is a log directory. Writing a JSP web shell into the PSEMHUB WAR path gives code execution as the PeopleSoft service account. - Deserialization on restart (ZDI-CAN-31817). Any file-write primitive can also plant an XML file in
[docroot]/envmetadata/data/environment/. WhenHubServletinitialises, for example after a system or service restart,startServerPeerincom.peoplesoft.pt.environmentmanagement.hub.Serverloads every file in that directory throughXMLDecoder, so the payload runs before the cast toEnvironmentfails. ZDI notes this route needs no JSP web shell.
For defenders, that means blocking /PSEMHUB/ alone does not close the SSRF entry point on /PSIGW/HttpListeningConnector. It also means unexpected files in envmetadata/data/environment/ can trigger code execution at the next restart, even after a web shell has been removed.
Indicators from GTIG (defanged)
| Indicator | Role |
|---|---|
5[.]199[.]162[.]157 | Attack controller, scanner, HTTP callback receiver |
104[.]219[.]234[.]138 | Exfiltration staging, remote management |
162[.]219[.]30[.]165 (TCP/3333 control, TCP/3334 data) | SIDEEYE C2 |
winmanage-me[.]network | Resolves to the staging host; MeshCentral infrastructure |
x.jsp SHA-256 | 48b4a0827da7bbfce9fb52464f8a659dea7a035189c52c506c0bfb4b1c3fe494 |
u.jsp SHA-256 | 2bee941fb40519d0d1ec52bd79a8f63fc65aac6455c8f2d6b668e3360dfdb5d7 |
Ple64.exe SHA-256 | 3ba215692665513abfffd4e815c5c45f2d41e5dcc4283a2a3b740930c5c417c3 |
Web shells appear under <PS_CFG_HOME>/webserv/<domain>/applications/peoplesoft/PSEMHUB.war/.
What defenders should do
- Patch. Apply the patch in Oracle's Security Alert for CVE-2026-35273. WAF rules were the stopgap this actor walked around.
- Reduce exposure. GTIG advises disabling the EMHub service in multi-server configurations and removing PSEMHUB entirely in single-server ones. Keep it off the internet either way.
- Hunt. Search PIA WebLogic access logs for
/PSEMHUB/and percent-encoded variants, especiallyPOSTrequests to/hub. Inspect thePSEMHUB.wardirectory andPORTAL.war, includingenvmetadata/transactions/, for unexpected.jsp,.jspxand.exefiles, and check for unexpected MeshCentral agents. Check every WebLogic node behind a load balancer, not only the first one you find. Monitor outbound traffic to the indicators above. Also review database audit logs for bulk queries or exports against HR, payroll and student records. - Watch for fileless activity. Alert on shells (
cmd.exe,/bin/sh,bash) spawned by the WebLogic Java process, particularly those invokingbase64 -d,curl,/dev/tcp,tasklistorstart /b. Review PeopleSoft and database hosts for large.tar,.tar.gzand.zstarchives in temporary or web-accessible directories. - Rotate credentials. Replace credentials readable by the PeopleSoft application service account: database connection strings in
psappsrv.cfg, Integration Broker credentials and any cloud credentials reachable from the web tier. - Plan for extortion. GTIG notes UNC6240's well-established pattern of stealing data and threatening to leak it unless the victim pays, so prepare legal and communications teams.
The lesson
A WAF rule keyed to a literal path is a virtual patch, and a virtual patch is only as good as its normalisation. The same lesson applies in the WebLogic proxy-bypass case: when the fix exists, the front-end filter is a stopgap, not the remedy.